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Abstract
The robustness of distributed systems is usually phrased in terms of the number of
failures of certain types that they can withstand. However, these failure models are
too crude to describe the different kinds of trust and expectations of participants
in the modern world of complex, integrated systems extending across different
owners, networks, and administrative domains. Modern systems often exist in an
environment of heterogeneous trust, in which different participants may have dif-
ferent opinions about the trustworthiness of other nodes, and a single participant
may consider other nodes to differ in their trustworthiness. We explore how to con-
struct distributed protocols that meet the requirements of all participants, even in
heterogeneous trust environments. The key to our approach is using lattice-based
information flow to analyze and prove protocol properties. To demonstrate this
approach, we show how two earlier distributed algorithms can be generalized to
work in the presence of heterogeneous trust: first, Heterogeneous Fast Consensus,
an adaptation of the earlier Bosco Fast Consensus protocol; and second, Nysiad, an
algorithm for converting crash-tolerant protocols to be Byzantine-tolerant. Through
simulations, we show that customizing a protocol to a heterogeneous trust config-
uration yields performance improvements over the conventional protocol designed
for homogeneous trust.
1. Introduction
Fault tolerance is critical for distributed systems. Traditionally, distributed systems
and protocols are designed around the ability to tolerate some number of failures,
sometimes differentiated by type, such as crash or Byzantine [8, 20, 29, 30]. For
well-studied problems such as consensus, lower bounds are traditionally expressed
in terms of the number of participants needed to tolerate some number of failures
f [6, 7, 20, 32]. In our increasingly interconnected world, however, systems
must routinely operate across locations and between different owners, requiring
a richer notion of what failures are possible. In complex systems integrated across
administrative domains (that is, federated systems), different participants in the
system may not even agree on what types of failures may occur or where in the
system [4, 11, 16, 33].
For example, suppose Alice is building a new app, a competitor to Bob’s.
However, due to the nature of the application, it is best if Alice and Bob’s apps
agree (quickly) on some things. Alice’s app works with servers maintained by
Carol, Dave, and Eve. Due to strong records and reliably enforced SLAs, Alice
is willing to allow her program to fail if Carol, Dave, or Eve do. She does not
tolerate their failure. She fears, however, that Bob may lie to her. On the other
hand, Bob, Carol, Dave, and Eve do not know Alice (her app is new, after all),
and believe she may lie or crash. As established businesses with contracts and
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Figure 1. Red solid arrows represent participants’ belief that another participant
might lie (integrity failure), while blue striped arrows represent participants’ be-
lief that another participant may crash (availability failure). Everyone but Alice
believes at most one crash may occur, and Alice may lie in addition. Alice believes
only Bob can fail, although he may fail in any manner.
track records, however, they believe each other to be honest, although they have a
healthy tolerance for at most one crash among themselves.
This trust configuration, depicted in Figure 1, is much more complex than in the
traditional models where participants uniformly agree on the maximum number of
crash failures and the maximum number of Byzantine failures. In this paper, we
explore the possibility of more general distributed protocols that take into account
and even exploit such complex, heterogeneous trust.
1.1 Contribution
Heterogeneous trust presents a challenge for designing fault-tolerant protocols.
Our key idea is to use information flow methods to reason about the integrity
and availability properties of distributed systems. Prior work on information flow
methods has mostly addressed confidentiality properties of systems [28], though
some prior work [35, 36, 38, 40] has addressed integrity and availability properties
in a limited way. However, our work exploits information flow in a more general
and sophisticated way.
We construct and analyze fault tolerant protocols by tracking the integrity
and availability of flows of information through the protocol. Intuitively, each
participant characterizes its assumptions about the availability and integrity of
system components as a label drawn from a rich lattice that expresses the trust of
participants. The labels are expressive enough to represent various combinations
of crash and/or Byzantine failures, as expected by the various participants. Using
these labels, it is then possible to analyze under what conditions the results of
running a protocol have an availability and integrity acceptable to each participant.
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When participants have different opinions about the trustworthiness of the sys-
tem components, a new phenomenon arises: some participants’ trust assumptions
may be violated while others’ assumptions still hold. We consider a protocol to
be correct only if the violation of one participant’s trust assumptions cannot dam-
age the availability or integrity of the system as viewed by any participant whose
assumptions have not been violated. Naturally, not all protocols can be run with
all possible configurations of trust among participants; each protocol has minimal
requirements concerning those participants’ trust in each other.
As an example of this style of synthesis, we present Heterogeneous Fast Consen-
sus, a generalization of the “Bosco” protocol [32]. This generalization achieves the
same bounds when traditional homogeneous trust assumptions are used, but the
protocol is capable of operating with heterogeneous assumptions. We generalize
the traditional properties of a consensus protocol—Unanimity, Validity, Progress,
and Termination—for heterogeneous trust environments [6, 32]. We explain this
protocol’s requirements, and prove it satisfies these properties. Using simulations,
we also demonstrate that Heterogeneous Fast Consensus offers significant advan-
tages in speed and resource requirements when compared to the Fast Consensus
protocol it generalizes.
As a second example, we develop a generalization of Byzantine tolerant Or-
dered, Asynchronous, Reliable Broadcast (OARcast) and Nysiad, an algorithm for
converting crash-tolerant protocols into Byzantine-tolerant protocols [13, 14]. This
generalization demonstrates that in some cases, Availability and Integrity can affect
each other in counterintuitive ways. For example, Nysiad includes cases in which
a participant cannot affect a value’s integrity, but can make it unavailable by lying.
1.2 Related Work
Others have looked into richer notions of failure, including generalizing f -failures
to failure-prone and survivor sets [16], or mixing availability (omission, or Crash)
and integrity (commission, or Byzantine) failures [12, 23, 31]. Some work operates
on expanded failure models, including notions of selfish but not malicious partic-
ipants, sometimes mixed with other kinds of failure [1, 3]. A distinctive feature
of our work is the removal of the assumption that all participants share the same
notion of possible failures. Properties of the form “as long as the failure assump-
tion is not violated, it is guaranteed that . . . ” can be generalized to explain which
guarantees can be made for which participants.
This work exists at the intersection of information flow analysis, a technique
traditionally applied through programming languages (e.g., [25]), and distributed
systems theory. Most prior research on language-based security has not concerned
itself with fault tolerance, but there are exceptions. Zheng has explored using infor-
mation flow to reason about availability [38] and integrity [40] properties, including
in distributed systems [37, 39], but the focus has been on linguistic mechanisms
and simple quorum-based protocols. Walker et al. [34] design a lambda calculus
formalizing the possibility of an integrity fault on a single machine.
Consensus, of course, is a widely-studied topic under a variety of failure mod-
els [15, 18, 19, 32]. Our particular generalization of the Bosco Byzantine fast con-
sensus protocol [32] serves as the first known example of consensus under hetero-
geneous mutual distrust.
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2. System model
2.1 Network
Our trust model is similar that used in other models of distributed systems [18, 30,
32]. We assume an asynchronous network environment in which any participant
can communicate with any other. There is no guarantee, however, that participants
trust each other. We assume that the network is, or can be made, reliable. That is
to say, our participants are assumed to have whatever message resending protocols
(e.g., [2, 27]) are necessary to guarantee that the only case in which a message
never arrives is the case in which the sender or receiver have failed in some way.
Additionally, we assume that faulty participants cannot forge the source identity of
a message sent by a correct participant; cryptographic signatures are one way to
achieve this.
In order to guarantee probabilistic termination in Heterogeneous Fast Consen-
sus, we also assume that for any set of messages, no one of which is causally before
another, if the set is sent repeatedly, the network will eventually deliver them in
each possible order.
2.2 Heterogeneous Trust
Each participant has its own assumptions concerning the availability of the system
(who might crash), and the integrity of the system (who might lie, or do something
other than correctly execute the protocol). These assumptions can be thought of as
describing what “attacker” is expected by each protocol participant. The limits of
this attacker’s power can be captured using information-flow labels (See section 3).
In a system with heterogneous trust, participants that have not failed can then be
characterized as either gurus or chumps:
Gurus are participants who function correctly and whose trust assumptions are
not violated. By definition, no set of failures that actually occur can violate the
availability or integrity expectations of a guru. For most protocols, most guarantees
made pertain to gurus.
Chumps are participants who function correctly—they obey the prescribed pro-
tocol and do not crash—but whose trust assumptions have been violated. In tra-
ditional failure-tolerant systems with homogeneous trust, all participants make the
same trust assumptions, so either all correct participants are chumps (in which case
few or no guarantees are made), or everyone is a guru. Here, we must be more nu-
anced. Unsurprisingly, chumps may receive “wrong” results.
Recall the example from section 1. Five participants have a trust configuration
in which everyone but Alice tolerates one crash among themselves, and tolerates
Byzantine behavior from Alice. Alice tolerates failures only from Bob, but tolerates
Byzantine failures on his part.
Suppose the participants wish to achieve consensus on data for Alice’s app
quickly, ideally in a single round in the usual case. For example, they might want
to use the Bosco Byzantine consensus protocol, which can achieve consensus
quickly. For Bosco, however, at least nine participants would be required, since
some participants believe at least one Byzantine failure can occur, in addition to
one crash. The five current participants would have to recruit others with relevant
trust properties. In fact, tolerating just one Byzantine failure requires at least
6 participants for any one-communication-step consensus protocol tolerating f
4 2018/10/9
failures [32]. As we show in section 5, it is nevertheless possible to create a variant
of the Bosco fast consensus protocol that satisfies the requirements of all five
participants, with no additional participants.
3. Information flow policies
3.1 Labels
Information flow control offers a way to reason about the properties of informa-
tion in a system. While most prior work on information flow has concentrated
on proving confidentiality properties, it is also possible to reason about the in-
tegrity [24, 26] and availability [38] of information. In this work, we focus on
availability and integrity of the information used in distributed protocols, and leave
confidentiality concerns to future work.
To support the analysis of information flow, all information in the system is
assigned a label drawn from a lattice of labels that express information security
requirements for the labeled information. [10, 24]. As information flows through
the system, its label (ordinarily) moves only upward in the lattice. With dynamic
information flow control, this label is represented explicitly at run time, whereas
with static information flow control, it is merely a compile-time aspect of the
information. In this work, we use static information flow control, because we want
to design protocols whose properties are verified before execution.
In this work, we adapt the Decentralized Label Model (DLM) [24] to capture the
integrity and availability requirements of information used in protocols. The DLM
is designed for systems in which principals are mutually distrusting, which is ideal
for the design of distributed protocols.
3.2 Principals
Policies are expressed in terms of principals, which may represent machines, users
or other entities to whom permissions may be given. One principal may be trusted
at least as much as another principal. If a principal p is at least as trusted as a
principal q, we say that p acts for q, written p < q.1 Any action that can be taken
by q can also be taken by p, meaning that p can act with the full authority of q.
The universally trusted principal > can act for everyone; ⊥ is the principal with
minimal authority, for whom everyone may act.
Compound principals are a way of expressing principals representing the actions
of multiple principals [21, 38]. In particular, we use the conjunctive principal p∧ q
to represent the least upper bound of the authority of p and q (essentially, their
combined authority) and the disjunctive principal p ∨ q to represent their greatest
lower bound. Therefore, for any principals p and q, we have p∧qpp∨q. Formal
rules for compound  can be found in Appendix A.
3.3 Policies
A label is a set of policies, and the label is enforced exactly when all the policies
in ` are enforced. A policy is a statement that some principal, an owner, trusts
some other principal to affect the labeled information. Two kinds of policies are
considered here. A policy of the form o I←−p signifies that owner principal o trusts
only principal p (or other principals that act for p) to affect the content of this
1 This is essentially the same idea as “speaks for” [21] in authorization logics.
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information; similarly policy o A←−p means that o trusts p with the availability of
this information (that is, trusts p to not make it unavailable).
This makes intuitive sense if p is a host principal, but p could also be a compound
principal representing multiple hosts. For example, a policy o I←−p ∨ q means that
o trusts both hosts p and q with the integrity of the labeled data; a failure of either
principal can destroy its integrity. Since principal p acts for p ∨ q, a Byzantine
failure of p could also compromise p ∨ q. Conversely, the policy o I←−p ∧ q means
that o believes that the integrity of the labeled data will be compromised only if
both p and q fail.
3.4 Ordering labels
One label `2 is at least as restrictive as another label `1, written `1v`2, if it is
always permissible to use information labeled `1 in a situation where information
with label `2 is expected. For this to be true, `1 must offers integrity and availability
guarantees at least as strong as those offered by `2. We define the no more
restrictive than relation v on labels using the relations vI and vA on integrity
and availability policies. For l1 to be no more restrictive than l2 in the DLM, every
principal must believe that the integrity and availability requirements expressed by
l2 are enforced by l1. For example, we have {o I←−p} v {o I←−p ∨ q}, because the
left-hand label means that o believes only p has affected the data, whereas the right-
hand label also permits q to affect it. Thus, the more principals have affected some
information, the more restricted future use of the information becomes.
Principals are only responsible for enforcing policies that they own, but if
p1p2, then p1 enforces all labels that p2 owns. If labels contain multiple policies
owned by multiple different principals, principals may have different views of the
ordering on those labels. That is why information flow is considered acceptable
only when the ordering on the labels is acceptable according to the view of every
principal.
The formal definition of the relationship l1 v l2 also takes into account the
trust relationships among principals [10]. Because of trust relationships, the most
restrictive integrity policy is⊥ I←−⊥, since all principals believe any principal could
influence the information, and the least restrictive is > I←−>, since all principals
believe that only > has influenced the information (that is, it is always very
trustworthy). Availability works much like integrity, with ⊥ A←−⊥ meaning anyone
can interfere with the labeled information’s availability and > A←−> meaning that
only> can stop the information from being available. A more formalized definition
of v can be found in Appendix A. Figure 2 illustrates the lattice of the integrity
and availability labels.
We define the notation I(`) to mean the integrity policies of a label, and
A(`) to mean the availability policies of a label. The relationship l1 v l2 holds
exactly when the same relationship holds separately on the availability and integrity
policies of the label: `1v`2 ⇔ I(`1)vI(`2) ∧A(`1)vA(`2).
3.5 Lattice operators
Since labels form a lattice, there are the usual lattice join (unionsq) and meet (u)
operators. The join of two labels gives the strongest integrity and availability that
both kinds of information can flow to, and the meet gives the weakest integrity and
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{
> I←−>;> A←−>
}
{
⊥ I←−⊥;⊥ A←−⊥
}
{
⊥ I←−⊥;> A←−>
} {
> I←−>;⊥ A←−⊥
}
v
increasingly restrictive
integrity
increasingly restrictive
availability
Figure 2. The integrity and availability lattice of labels.
availability that is allowed to flow to both kinds of information. Thus, unionsq acts as a
disjunction and u acts as a conjunction.
For example, {o I←−p} unionsq {o I←−q} = {o I←−p∨ q}, and {o I←−p}u{o I←−q} = {o I←−p∧
q}. A more formalized definition can be found in Appendix A.
The operations unionsq and u operate separately on the integrity and availability
components of labels:
I(`1unionsq`2) = I(`1)unionsqI(`2) A(`1unionsq`2) = A(`1)unionsqA(`2)
I(`1u`2) = I(`1)uI(`2) A(`1u`2) = A(`1)uA(`2)
4. Reasoning about heterogeneous trust
4.1 Threshold synthesizers
Zheng and Myers introduced the concept of message synthesizers in a distributed
system [37, 39]. A synthesizer listens for messages from a set of hosts, and based
on messages received, may produce a value with a label representing assurances
that can exceed what any one message can provide.
For example, suppose a principal p awaits the receipt of messages ma,mb,mc
from principals a, b, and c. Let us use `(m) to denote the label of message
m. Assuming p trusts a, b, and c to send these messages, the least restrictive
guarantee that can be made regarding their availability is that A(`(ma)) ={
p
A←−a
}
, A(`(mb)) =
{
p
A←−b
}
, and A(`(mc)) =
{
p
A←−c
}
. Suppose the mes-
sage synthesizer pifastest listens for these messages and returns whichever message
arrives first. This synthesizer produces a value that is more available (has less re-
strictive availability) than any one of the messages, because the value is unavailable
only if all three of a, b, and c are unavailable:
A(`(pifastest)) = A(`(ma))uA(`(mb))uA(`(mc)) =
{
p
A←−(a ∧ b ∧ c)
}
However, this synthesizer allows a, b, or c to affect its value, so its integrity is
correspondingly lowered:
I(`(pifastest)) = I(`(ma))unionsqI(`(mb))unionsqI(`(mc)) =
{
p
I←−(a ∨ b ∨ c)
}
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In contrast, we might have a different message synthesizer piall that returns a
value only once it receives all three messages, and only if all three carry identical
values. In this case, the results are available only if all the message senders are
available (any one sender can render it unavailable), but the integrity of the result
is much less restrictive: the result can be corrupted only if all three messages were
corrupted:
A(`(piall )) = A(`(ma))unionsqA(`(mb))unionsqA(`(mc)) =
{
p
A←−(a ∨ b ∨ c)
}
I(`(piall )) = I(`(ma))uI(`(mb))uI(`(mc)) =
{
p
I←−(a ∧ b ∧ c)
}
The availability constraint poses an interesting problem here: sometimes we
want to know if an availability constraint is met. For example, we might want to
know if piall received contradictory messages. We follow Zheng [37] by using the
special value none to denote a detectably unavailable value.
A consensus protocol is a form of message synthesizer. It takes in messages,
and synthesizes a consensus message, accompanied by availability and integrity
guarantees that no one message could have.
4.2 Comparison to survivor sets and failure-prone sets
A different way to express the powers of an attacker is to use failure-prone sets of
principals. [16, 17, 22]. A non-blocking protocol is one in which no failure of any
subset of a failure-prone set prevents termination or progress. The complements of
failure-prone sets are survivor sets. Every failure of any subset of a failure prone
set leaves at least one survivor set failure-free.
We can therefore express a principal psys that has the least restrictive integrity
or availability the system can have, as the disjunction of each of the survivor sets,
each represented by the conjunction of its members.
Similarly, we can express a principal pattack that has the most restrictive avail-
ability or integrity the attacker can’t have, as the weakest compound principal such
that it is impossible to partition the set of principals into one partition whose con-
junction implies psys, and another whose conjunction implies pattack. A survivor
set survives iff the attacker cannot act for pattack, and so in the case of crash fail-
ures, a piece of information that must be supplied by a survivor set to some prin-
cipal o has the availability o A←−pattack, and in the case of Byzantine failures, the
integrity o I←−pattack.
For example, in a system of four participants P = {a, b, c, d}, any one of which
might fail we have:
psys = (a ∧ b ∧ c) ∨ (a ∧ b ∧ d) ∨ (a ∧ c ∧ d) ∨ (b ∧ c ∧ d)
pattack = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) ∨ (a ∧ d) ∨ (b ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ d) ∨ (c ∧ d)
Using this construction, any protocol phrased in terms of survivor and failure-
prone sets can be expressed in terms of labels instead. Since the condition that no
more than f failures occur can be converted to survivor and failure-prone sets, it
can also be expressed in terms of labels.
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There is also a certain kind of equivalence between labels and survivor sets: any
label can be expressed in terms of (for each principal) two collections of survivor
and failure-prone sets, describing the crash and Byzantine failures that principal
tolerates.
5. Heterogeneous fast consensus
As an example of a protocol adapted for a heterogeneous trust environment,
we present Heterogeneous Fast Consensus, a generalization of the Bosco Fast
Consensus protocol [32]. Fast Consensus is a one-round protocol that can, in the
best case, decide on a consensus value in one communication step. If it fails to
decide, some underlying consensus is used; this can be another round of Fast
Consensus. The desirable properties of a traditional consensus protocol [6, 32] can
be generalized for heterogeneous trust:
Agreement: If two gurus decide, then they decide the same value. Also, if a guru
decides more than once, it decides the same value each time.
Unanimity: If all correct participants have the same initial value v, a guru that
decides must decide v.
Validity: If a participant decides a value, and all participants are correct, then that
value was proposed by some participant.
Progress: Under the assumption that underlying consensus terminates, all gurus
eventually decide.
Termination: Under the assumption that the network delivers concurrent messages
in random order, and underlying consensus is simply a recursive invocation of
another instance of Fast Consensus, all gurus eventually decide with probability 1.
Algorithm 1 contains the pseudo-code for Heterogeneous Fast Consensus, and
Appendix B contains the proof of correctness. Each participant broadcasts its
starting value to each participant (including itself). Once it can no longer be sure
it will receive any more messages (given its failure assumptions), the participant
looks over the values it has received. If a set of identically-valued messages
meets the high, decision, threshold, that participant can decide that value. What
a participant does to decide varies depending upon underlying-consensus(), but if
underlying-consensus() is fast-consensus(), it simply broadcasts the decided value
one last time:
decide(v) : {
send message with value v to each participant;
return v
}
If some value has a set of messages which meet a lower change threshold, then
the participant enters underlying-consensus() with that as its starting value. Oth-
erwise, the participant picks a value v from those received using some selection-
function(), and invokes underlying-consensus(v).
The function selection-function() varies depending upon the desired properties
of the protocol and on underlying-consensus(). If underlying-consensus() is fast-
consensus(), the protocol may converge fastest if selection-function always selects
the first in some arbitrary but consistent ordering of the input values. However,
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1 Function fast-consensus(vp):
2 send message with value vp to each participant;
3 Upon receipt of a message:
4 R←−the set of messages received thus far;
5 if sufficiently-available(R) then
6 forall the unique values v in m ∈ R do
7 S ← {m|(value of m) = v ∧m ∈ R};
8 if sufficient-to-decide(S) then
9 return decide(v);
10 else if sufficient-to-change(S) then
11 return underlying-consensus(v)
12 end
13 end
14 return underlying-consensus(
selection-function(R))
15 end
16 end
17 end
Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code for Fast Consensus [32]. The input is the starting
value for a given participant. Functions sufficiently-available(), sufficient-to-
decide, and selection-function are discussed elsewhere. Function underlying-
consensus is the consensus protocol to be used in the case that this one-
round consensus fails to decide. It is assumed to take as input a participant’s
starting value, and it can be another round of fast-consensus(). This pseudo-
code assumes a language mechanism for generating a list of expected messages
for this particular consensus round.
this deterministic strategy may permit a Byzantine attacker to prevent agreement
in each round. It is therefore prudent to incorporate some randomness in selection-
function(), as in RS-Bosco [32].
5.1 Modeling simple homogeneous trust
In the traditional case, in which all n participants believe that any c participants
may crash, and any b participants may fail in Byzantine fashion (which traditionally
includes crashing, so c ≥ b), the thresholds are fairly straightforward [32]:
• sufficiently-available(R) ≡ |R| ≥ n− c
• sufficient-to-decide(S) ≡ |S| > n+c2 + b
• sufficient-to-change(S) ≡ |S| > n−c2
Requirements: This protocol has similarly straightforward requirements on the
values of n, c and b. A participant can only be sure of receiving n − c votes, and
needs more than n+c2 + b to decide anything, so it is required that n > 3c + 2b.
If only crash failures are expected (b = 0), then this means n > 3c, and if only
Byzantine failures are expected (b = c), then this means n > 5b. These bounds are
known to be tight for single-communication-step consensus [32].
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5.2 Heterogeneous Trust
In an information flow setting, labels are assigned to each piece of information
to describe properties such as availability and integrity, characterizing who might
make that information unavailable or affect its contents (section 3). In this case,
each message m has a corresponding label `(m). A set of messages taken together
can be used to synthesize a value with more integrity or availability than any
message alone (section 4.1).
Each participant may have a different idea of the possible failures. A participant
p can phrase its requirement for when it believes it cannot be certain of receiving
any more messages as, for some availability policy Apsys unique to p, the conditiond
m∈R A(`(m))vApsys. Label Apsys may be constructed as in section 4.2. As Apsys
should contain only policies owned by p, and the only portions of the label on m
which p must enforce are those owned by p, we can define:
Asys =
d
p∈P A
p
sys, and can then write:
sufficiently-available(R) ≡
l
m∈R
A(`(m))vAsys
Similarly, a threshold Cp, composed of both availability and integrity policies,
represents when a participant feels a set of messages should be sufficient to force it
to change its starting value to a particular value in underlying-consensus. We define
C =
d
p∈P C
p, and:
sufficient-to-change(S) ≡
l
m∈S
`(m)vC
Similarly, a threshold Dp, composed of both availability and integrity policies,
represents when a participant feels a set of messages should be sufficient to decide
on a value carried by all of those messages. We define D =
d
p∈P D
p, and:
sufficient-to-decide(S) ≡
l
m∈S
`(m)vD
5.3 Requirements
As in the case of simple homogeneous trust, heterogeneous trust imposes require-
ments on the values of Aattack, Asys, Iattack, Isys, C, and D, as well as on the labels
of messages sent as part of the protocol.
Let mpq designate a message from participant p to participant q. Let A
p
attack
designate the most restrictive availability label participant p believes an attacker
can’t block. Let Ipattack designate the most restrictive integrity label participant p
believes an attacker can’t influence.
From the perspective of a principal p, therefore, we can define failure-prone sets
for Byzantine and crash failures, called Liar sets and Crash sets:
L is a liar set ⇔
 l
p∈P,q∈L
{
p
I←−q
} /v Ipattack
H is a crash set ⇔
 l
p∈P,q∈H
{
p
A←−q
} /v Apattack
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It is possible, for example, to construct Apsys given A
p
attack from survivor sets: the
crash sets’ compliments. This notation simplifies future expressions.
A participant may not be able to send a message if it is itself unavailable.
Therefore, from the perspective of participant q, the availability of a message mpq
from participant p is limited by this constraint:{
q
A←−p
}
vA(`(mpq)) (1)
Each participant collects received messages R until the meet of their labels of
all received messages is no more restrictive than Asys. This places a limit on viable
systems. For no participant should it ever be the case that the attacker (as perceived
by that participant) can prevent such a set of messages from arriving:
∀q ∈ P. ∀F ⊆ P. (q 6∈ F )∧
l
f∈F
{
q
A←−f
}
/vAattack
⇒ l
p∈(P−F )
(
A
(
`
(
mpq
)))vAsys
(2)
If underlying-consensus() is fast-consensus(), no participant should progress to the
next round unless it can complete that round with certainty. This condition implies
that if messages from a set of participants messages can propel p to the next round,
but not q, then p must be able to progress with that set, without q.
∀r, q ∈ P. ∀R ⊆ P.((d
p∈S A(`(m
p
r))vAsys
)
∧
(d
p∈S A(`(m
p
q)) /vAsys
))
⇓(d
p∈S−{q}A(`(m
p
r))vAsys
) (3)
Another requirement is that no set of failures a participant believes might happen
should prevent that participant from deciding. Additionally, any set of messages
that makes a correct participant decide should also be sufficient to dictate that
participant’s value in underlying-consensus.(
Asysu
{
> I←−>
})
vDvC (4)
If a participant p decides, it is useful to talk about decider sets and their
complements, wrong sets. A decider set is any set of principals whose messages
can make p decide. In much the same way that we might construct Aattack and
crash sets from Asys, we can construct W and wrong sets from D.
E is a decider set ⇔
l
e∈E
`
(
mep
)vD
G is a wrong set ⇔
l
g∈G
`
(
mgp
)
/vW
A wrong set is any set of participants who broadcast, or may have broadcast, a
value other than the one p decided during the round in which p decided. The label
W dictates the least restrictive availability and integrity that no wrong set may
have.
Assuming underlying-consensus has unanimity, Fast Consensus assures agree-
ment by ensuring that if one guru decides, then all correct participants who have
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Aasys =
{
a
A←−(a ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e)
}
∀p ∈ {b, c, d, e}. Apsys =
{
p
I←−p ∧
(∨
x,y,z∈{b,c,d,e} (x ∧ y ∧ z)
)}
∀p ∈ P. Cp =
{
p
I←−∨x,y∈{b,c,d,e} (x ∧ y)}
∀p ∈ P. Dp =
{
p
I←−∨x,y,z∈{b,c,d,e} (x ∧ y ∧ z)}
∀p, q ∈ P. A(`(mqp)) = {p A←−q}
∀p, q ∈ P. I(`(mqp)) = {p I←−q}
Figure 3. Using fast-consensus as underlying-consensus, and a selection-function
of their choice (e.g., random selection), the participants in the example can execute
fast consensus with these threshold values and labels.
not yet decided enter underlying-consensus with the value decided. Fast Consensus
therefore has some requirements pertaining to C and D.
If p is a guru, then none of p’s perceived wrong sets, combined with any of p’s
perceived liar sets, should be able to change anyone’s vote. Otherwise, a set of
liars combined with a set of participants p is aware may have broadcast something
other than it decided could prevent correct participants from entering underlying-
consensus with unanimous values.
∀p, q.
((l
l∈L
{
p
I←−l
})
/vIpattack ∧
(l
h∈H
{
p
A←−h
})
/vW
)
⇒
( l
x∈L∪H
`
(
mxq
))
/vC
(5)
We also require that if one guru decides, it must be impossible for any other
correct participant not to enter underlying-consensus with the decided value. This
means that for any group of liarsL, and any group of crashersH , and any additional
group J , if messages from L ∪H ∪ J make a guru decide, then messages from J ,
being the only ones guaranteed to get through to the other participants, must make
those participants enter underlying-consensus with the decided value.
∀p, q ∈ P.∀L,H, J ⊆ P.(((d
l∈L
{
p
I←−l
})
/vIpattack
)
∧
((d
h∈H
{
q
A←−h
})
/vAqattack
)
∧ ((dx∈L∪H∪J `(mxp))vD))
⇓(d
j∈J `
(
mjq
))
vC
(6)
5.4 Example
Returning to the example introduced in section 1, we can now synthesize a consen-
sus protocol for Alice, Bob, Carol, Dave, and Eve. For brevity, the letters a–e are
used to represent the five participants.
Alice believes that Bob may fail in a Byzantine fashion (lose integrity). She does
not believe any other failures may occur.
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Bob, Carol, Dave, and Eve each believe Alice can fail in a Byzantine fashion
(lose integrity), and believe that at most one other participant may crash (lose
availability) as well.
These trust assumptions are captured by the following labels:
Aaattack =
{
a
A←−a ∨ c ∨ d ∨ e
}
Iaattack =
{
a
I←−a ∨ c ∨ d ∨ e
}
∀p ∈ {b, c, d, e}.Apattack =
{
p
A←−p ∨
(∨
q,r∈{b,c,d,e} (q ∧ r)
)}
∀p ∈ {b, c, d, e}.Ipattack =
{
p
I←−b ∨ c ∨ d ∨ e
}
Solution: Search of the space of threshold labels (Asys, C,D) reveals that there
are indeed thresholds meeting the participants’ requirements, as well as the re-
quirements of Fast Consensus. Using fast-consensus as underlying-consensus, and
a selection-function of their choice (from a theoretical perspective, random selec-
tion works), they can execute Fast Consensus with the threshold values and labels
found in Figure 3.
One counterintuitive insight provided by our analysis is that there are occasions
in which Alice listens to Bob, despite the fact that she does not trust him at all.
From the label analysis, this falls out from Ca and Da, defined in Figure 3, which
can be shown to satisfy the threshold requirements.
Intuitively, the logic is this: If Alice is correct, and Bob is Byzantine, and so
everyone else is a chump, then it doesn’t matter what Alice decides, so long as
she does decide. If, on the other hand, Bob is only crash-failure prone, then Alice
can’t decide having heard only from, for example, Carol and Dave, because Carol
and Dave may have heard two votes from Eve and Bob, different from what they
voted for, and change their votes next round. As a result, Alice would have decided
something different from what the others decide, despite no one having been wrong
(or failing). Therefore, Alice must also wait to hear from Bob or Eve, to ensure that
in the event that Bob is only crash-prone, Carol, Dave, and Eve will decide the same
as what Alice decides.
Evaluation: In this trust configuration, Eve tolerates the Byzantine failure of Alice
and the simultaneous crash failure of Bob. Therefore, traditional (homogeneous)
Bosco would have to tolerate one Byzantine failure and one additional crash
failure, requiring a total of 9 participants. Already Heterogeneous Fast Consensus
has a clear advantage for this scenario: it requires only 5 participants to tolerate
this trust configuration, whereas traditional Bosco requires recruiting at least 4
more trustworthy participants, who also slow the system down. We simulated
1000 instances in which 9 participants participated in Bosco tolerating 1 Byzantine
failure and 2 total crash failures. The network delivered messages in each round in
an order drawn uniformly at random from all possible orderings. The selection-
function() used chose a value uniformly at random from the set of messages
received.
We also ran the same simulation for our Heterogeneous Fast Consensus imple-
mentation, and for each calculated the mean (with standard error) probability of a
participant deciding after each round. All participants began with different values.
For the case in which no failures occurred, the results are in figure 4. Not only
did Heterogeneous Fast Consensus converge quickly, in a median of 3 rounds,
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Figure 4. The probability of a participant deciding in each round, mean over
1000 samples, in our 5-participant Heterogeneous Fast Consensus protocol, and
a traditional 9-participant Bosco protocol. Standard error bars shown.
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Figure 5. The probability of a participant deciding in each round, mean over
1000 samples, in our 5-participant Heterogeneous Fast Consensus protocol, and a
traditional 9-participant Bosco protocol. In this case, Alice is Byzantine, and Bob
has crashed. Standard error bars shown.
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but it converged much faster than Homogeneous Bosco, in a median time of 5
rounds. The gap was even wider in the 95th percentile, where Heterogeneous Fast
Consensus took 5 rounds, and Homogeneous Bosco took 8.
For the case in which Alice has failed in a Byzantine fashion (specifically, she
proposes a new, never-before-seen value each round), and Bob has crashed, the
difference is even greater. With the reduced contention of fewer active participants,
Heterogeneous Fast Consensus converges even faster, the 95th percentile deciding
by round 4, while the homogeneous case takes until round 6 for the median to
decide, and round 12 before the 95th percentile decided. The full results are in
figure 5.
These results suggest that customizing the protocol to the heterogeneous trust
configuration yields clear advantages in both resource requirements and speed.
Determining threshold labels
One challenge of the Heterogeneous Fast Consensus protocol is finding appro-
priate threshold labels to satisfy the requirements of section 5.3. This is an offline
computation, so performance is not critical. We expressed the requirements using
quantifier-free bitvector logic (QF BV), and used the Z3 SMT solver to find so-
lutions. Generating four- to six-participant protocols took a few minutes for each
protocol. The time to generate protocols increases as the number of participants
increases, but one does not normally generate consensus protocols for very large
numbers of participants in any case.
We have made the search script available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/
akv957fmrqsn803/pysmt.zip?dl=0.
Generalized heterogeneous fault-tolerant protocols will have, in general, param-
eters specific to the needs of their participants. For example, heterogeneous fast
consensus has the thresholds Asys, C, and D, which must be crafted to fit the re-
quirements of the protocol and the specific distrust of the participants. The exact
nature of the complexity of such a search is unclear. For any given set of labels, it
is easy (a polynomial-time computation) to check that they meet these constraints.
The problem is therefore in NP, but the precise hardness of the problem remains
future work.
5.5 Very Fast Consensus
This construction of fast consensus suggests another way to exploit heterogeneous
trust. Suppose a client wishes to submit a request to a group of servers, from which
it requires an answer upon which the servers must reach consensus. Suppose this
operation is extremely latency-sensitive, and the goal is best-case performance of
one communication to the servers, no communication time between servers, and
one communication to the client. This construction of fast consensus extends to
cover this extremely latency-sensitive case simply by adding the client to the set
of participants, as a participant whom the servers don’t trust at all. The client
thus receives messages as a participant, and can set its own thresholds for when
it is satisfied consensus has been reached (subject, of course, to the protocol’s
requirements). This is not efficient in terms of bandwidth, but highly efficient in
terms of latency, as the client need not wait for any communication between servers
before servers send it a response.
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6. OARcast and Nysiad
To further illustrate the utility of our approach, we present a second generalization
of a distributed protocol, using the same techniques based on information flow anal-
ysis. In this case, we generalize Nysiad, an algorithm for converting crash-tolerant
state-machine systems ([30]) to Byzantine-tolerant ones [13, 14]. In particular, the
conversion process allows a faulty “sender” participant to interfere with the avail-
ability, but not the integrity, of a message.
6.1 Ordered Asynchronous Reliable Broadcast
At its core, Nysiad is built around Ordered Asynchronous Reliable broadcast
(OARcast), a protocol that is useful in its own right. OARcast, as presented in
[13, 14], works as follows.
There exists a set of participants known as echoers. One special echoer, the
designated sender, may wish to broadcast a message m such that all other echoers
receive it. The goal of the protocol is that all messages broadcast should arrive in
the same order at all nodes: the order in which they were sent.
Each message is assumed to be signed by both its author and its sender (which
may not be the author if the message is relayed through an echoer). Each message
is also assumed to contain a sequence number, assigned sequentially by the author.
Each echoer will echo any new message (that it’s not seen before) from the
designated sender to all other echoers. Any echoer that receives two messages
signed by the designated sender, and containing the same sequence number, that
have different values, ceases operation.
An echoer delivers a message (that is, produces a value) when it has delivered
messages with all lesser sequence numbers, and the set of identical messages its
received for this sequence number meets a condition. This condition can be ex-
pressed with label threshold synthesizers, instead of waiting for a specific number
of identical messages (See section 4.1). The basic requirement, that no set of mes-
sages from echoers should allow two guru echoers to deliver different messages,
remains the same. Specifically, if each echoer e has an integrity value Iea , defined
to be strictly less restrictive than the integrity of any attacker it tolerates, (expressed
@, meaning x @ y ⇔ xvy ∧ y /vx), and has some integrity threshold Te for deliv-
ering a message, the following condition must hold to ensure gurus never deliver
different messages:
∀e, e′ ∈ P.∀A,B,C ⊆ P : B ∩ C = {}.(
Iea @
d
q∈A I
(
`
(
mqe
))) ∧ (dq∈(A∪B) I(`(mqe))vTe)
⇓(d
q∈(A∪C) I
(
`
(
mqe′
))
/vTe′
) (7)
The proof of correctness proceeds exactly as in [13, 14]. Concerning safety
properties, it should be clear that:
• No two gurus can deliver different values for the same message sequence
number.
• If the designated sender is correct, then no correct participant (even a chump)
can simulate delivery of messages in any order other than that provided by the
designated sender.
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For liveness, however, we need a guarantee that:
• A guru will always deliver any message sent by a correctly functioning sender,
so long as no attacker can compromise a set of echoers such that the remainder
is insufficient for the guru. Formally:
∀e ∈ P.∀A ∪B = P.Iea @
l
q∈A
I(`(mqe))⇒
l
q∈(B)
I(`(mqe))vTe
With this additional requirement, no attacker can prevent a guru from reaching its
delivery conditions.
The integrity of the delivered message cannot therefore only be interfered with
by the echoer’s perceived attacker.2 In other words, the integrity of the delivered
message is Iea . Availability is limited by the sender, as well as any conditions under
which integrity is violated, calculated as follows:
Asu
⊔
M⊆{mpe|p∈P∧um∈M I(`(m))vIea }
( l
m∈M
A(`(m))
)
where As is the availability of the designated sender.
6.2 Nysiad
Nysiad, a translation mechanism from arbitrary crash-tolerant protocols to Byzan-
tine tolerant ones, also presented in [13, 14], can be performed using the heteroge-
neous OARCast.
The idea of Nysiad is to take any crash-tolerant system consisting of a collection
of deterministic state machines, and simulate it on each of a group of participants.
For each state machine in the original system, the participants form an OARcast,
and one participant is designated as the sender for that machine. Each participant
simulates the delivery of a message to each simulated state machine only if it has
itself calculated an identical simulated message sent to that simulated machine,
and it has received an identical message via that machine’s OARcast. In this way,
all gurus simulate identical executions, with identical message delivery ordering.
OARcast ensures that a failed participant cannot force two gurus to perceive
message delivery in different orders, and the requirement that each participant
derive the simulated messages themselves ensures that no failed participant can
force another participant to deliver an incorrect value. The availability of simulated
messages is thus limited by the availability of the simulated sender machine’s
designated sender participant, as well as the availability of the sender machine’s
OARcast. The integrity of simulated messages (which really is all in the ordering)
is limited only by the integrity of the sender machine’s OARcast, and not the
designated sender participant. Additionally, all information simulated on a given
participant is limited by that participant’s availability and integrity.
It is notable that, in the f -failure tolerant case, a Nysiad conversion of a 3f + 1
crash tolerant Bosco instance (with a deterministic selection function) is a 3f + 1
Byzantine tolerant consensus protocol with best-case two message sends from
proposal to decision, putting it on par (by this very simple metric), with Fast
2 Integrity, as far as OARcast is concerned, is a property of uniform and guaranteed message delivery,
and not content, which may have additional constraints.
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Byzantine Paxos [8, 19]. A generalized version of Heterogeneous Fast Consensus
can be likewise constructed for specific use cases.
As well as providing insightful cases in heterogeneous trust reasoning, the
Nysiad algorithm, already a useful tool in constructing Byzantine-tolerant proto-
cols, generalizes into a useful tool in heterogeneous trust based algorithms.
7. Future work
The tools, techniques, and examples in this work are meant to provide a framework
for reasoning about and constructing fault-tolerant distributed protocols. We hope
that protocol designers will expand on this approach to to develop novel protocols.
Heterogeneous Fast Consensus is both a novel protocol and a useful example of
applying information-flow techniques to fault tolerance. More efficient methods
for synthesizing threshold labels remain desirable.
The holy grail for heterogeneous trust would be a procedure for transforming
any existing fault-tolerant protocol into a generalized version that exploits hetero-
geneous trust. Such a procedure would require a way to automatically derive nec-
essary requirements on the trust configuration and the protocol instances. While it
is clear that such a procedure will not always be computable (a desirable property
might be termination, and it is impossible to compute requirements for termination
in general [5]), it may be feasible for useful cases.
The heterogeneous trust model of failure is extremely rich, but it does not take
into account notions of self-interest, and so there is room for complementary work
integrating game theory and selfish participants into this richer space [1, 3]. One
might envision, for example, protocols in which participants can derive the specific
implementations of an algorithm in which they take part (as opposed to centrally
determining this beforehand) using knowledge of the trust configurations, and the
belief that others will derive their implementations selfishly.
Finally, we have deliberately ignored confidentiality in this work, but confiden-
tiality is also conducive to analysis using static information-flow methods [28].
Taking confidentiality into account is likely to add additional constraints to proto-
col design.
8. Conclusion
In our increasingly complex, interconnected world, under varied and changing
threats and system models, it is critical to design systems that can operate in en-
vironments where participants make differing trust assumptions about the avail-
ability and integrity of information and of other participants. We propose the use
of information-flow labels describing integrity and availability as a way to express
those requirements and situations in a general manner, and to provide a rigorous
framework for reasoning about protocols using heterogeneous trust. Our general-
ization of the Bosco Fast Consensus protocol [32], developed with this methodol-
ogy, is capable of tolerating trust configurations for which traditional fast consensus
fails, or would be dramatically less efficient. Properties such as Agreement, Una-
nimity, Validity, and Termination can be generalized for the heterogeneous case,
in which some but not all correct participants make incorrect assumptions about
failure.
Likewise, our generalizations of OARcast and Nysiad [13, 14], and even ba-
sic message synthesizers may serve as useful tools and building blocks in the de-
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velopment of future protocols that use heterogeneous trust. The analysis of these
example algorithms should serve to help others gain insight in future endeavors.
We expect that our new approach will be useful for generalizing other fault
tolerant protocols to a heterogeneous trust environment, and we hope it will lead to
more efficient ways to build trustworthy systems.
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∀{p ∈ P}.∀X ∈ {A, I}.
((
∧
{
a
∣∣∣(po) ∧ (o X←−a) ∈ `1})(∧{a ∣∣∣(po) ∧ (o X←−a) ∈ `2}))
`1v`2
Figure 6. Ordering on labels.
A. Principal and Lattice Formalisms
A.1 Compound Principals and 
The rules for reasoning about compound principals:
(p1 ∧ p2)p1 p1(p1 ∨ p2)
p1p2 p2p3
p1p3
p1p3 p2p3
(p1 ∨ p2)p3
p1p2 p1p3
p1(p2 ∧ p3)
A.2 Labels
Labels are sets of policies.
A.2.1 unionsq and u
For availability or integrity labels:
I(`1unionsq`2) =
{
(u1 ∨ u2) I←−(p1 ∨ p2)
∣∣∣ u1 I←−p1 ∈ I(`1) ∧ u2 I←−p2 ∈ I(`2)}
A(`1unionsq`2) =
{
(u1 ∨ u2) A←−(p1 ∨ p2)
∣∣∣ u1 A←−p1 ∈ A(`1) ∧ u2 A←−p2 ∈ A(`2)}
`1u`2 = `1 ∪ `2
A.2.2 The lattice ordering
v on labels is intuitively defined in Section 3.4. Formally, it is defined in Figure 6.
This definition is similar to Stephen Chong’s [9].
A.2.3 Equality
Labels `1 and `2 are considered equal, or at least to lie in the same equivalence
class, iff (`1v`2) ∧ (`2v`1).
B. Heterogeneous consensus proofs
B.1 Agreement
If two gurus decide, they can do so either in the same round (of fast consensus), or
one can decide in fast consensus, and the other in underlying-consensus.
B.1.1 Same Round:
No two gurus decide different values in the same round, by (5), (4), andWvAattackuIattack
(from the definition ofW ). In particular, in order for a participant to decide, a group
of participants must send messages with a meet featuring a label vD. Therefore,
the meet of labels of messages from participants who either lied to or did not send
the decided value to the first participant is /vC. Given that DvC, no message syn-
thesized from participants who either lied to or did not send the decided value to
the first participant is vD. Therefore, no participant can decide any value other
than the one decided by the first participant in the same round. Therefore, if two
participants decide in the same round, they decide the same value.
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B.1.2 Different Rounds:
By (6), if one guru decides, then for each other correct participant, there exists—
among the participants from whom the guru has received messages—some subset
J that is correct and whose messages are received by the other participant. Further-
more, J is sufficient to change the vote of that other participant to the value that
has been decided.
Therefore, all correct participants (who have not yet decided) enter underlying-
consensus with the decided value as their starting value. Assuming the first decid-
ing participant behaves at least as a participant in underlying-consensus (as is the
case for the given decide procedure when underlying-consensus is fast consensus),
then if underlying-consensus guarantees unanimity, then all gurus will decide the
same value as the first participant, and so all future decisions by gurus will agree
with the first participant.
This protocol does not permit the possibility of the same guru deciding twice in a
round of fast consensus, and so agreement of underlying-consensus combined with
unanimity of underlying-consensus guarantees that any guru who decides twice
must decide the same value both times.
B.2 Unanimity
Given (4), if all correct participants send messages of the same value, the meet of
the labels of those messages is vD. By (6), this requires that even in the presence
of attackers, all correct participants will receive a set of messages with the “correct”
value such that the meet of their labels vC. All of the correct participants will
therefore hold the same value when moving into underlying-consensus.
Therefore, if underlying-consensus has Unanimity, then so does Fast-consensus.
If underlying-consensus is fast-consensus, then no correct participant can decide
any value other than the correct value. Given that in each round, all correct
participants will enter with the same value, guaranteeing they do so in the next
round, no correct participant will ever broadcast any other value. It is possible for
a correct participant to receive all the messages from the correct participants first,
and therefore decide on the correct value.
B.3 Validity
The decision procedure of this protocol only allows a correct participant to decide
on an element of the set of values from received messages. Because received
messages must have been sent (network assumption), we have validity.
B.4 Progress
From the perspective of any guru:
Given (1) , (2), and (3), any attacker with availability /vAattack would be unable
to violate the system availability assumptions
(
Asys
)
of any set of participants such
that the meet of the labels of the messages of the remainder /vAsys.
Therefore, any guru can always expect a set of messages such that the meet of
the availability of their labels vAsys, and can therefore always either decide or
move on to underlying-consensus.
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B.5 Termination
If p is a guru, then under the “random network” assumption, with some non-zero
probability p will in some round get messages from all correct processes, the meet
of the labels of which are vAsys, and so it will move on the next round.
There is likewise some non-zero probability that all correct participants will
receive messages in the same order as p.
From requirement 3, the availability of the meet of the labels of the set of
messages p received must be enough to carry a set of participants into the next
round that will allow p to make further progress. (The combined availability of
their messages to p must be vAsys.)
From the structure of the protocol, and requirements 5 and 6, no two correct
processes should be forced to select different values after having received identical
sets of messages.
Therefore, if selection-function has a non-zero probability of selecting each item
in the input set, there is a non-zero probability that a round exists in which p
progresses, as do a set of other correct participants who have sufficient availability
for p to continue to progress, and all of them send messages of identical value.
By requirement 4, this is sufficient for p to decide that value, provided p
receives all of those messages first. This will occur with some non-zero probability.
Therefore, in any pair of consecutive rounds, there is a non-zero probability a guru
will decide. Therefore, each guru, with probability 1, eventually decides.
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